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Roots of traditional progres-
sivism still off er the best ba· 






of the century 
By Jerome A. Popp 
As we enter the 1980s it seems appropriate to reflect 
upon the natu re o f our inquiry-as i t was, is, and shou ld 
be in the future. I want to suggest that it is time to 
seriously reconsider the tenets of educational pro· 
gressivism. I will not be suggesting that we simply iden· 
tlfy educational progressivism as it existed in the first 
20 years of this century and reinstate it in the last 20 years; 
what I hope to show is that the roots of traditional 
progressivism still offer the best basis for building a 
sound view of education for now and the future. It 
behooves us to view our work as growing out of traditional 
progressivism and toward a neoprogressivism. 
1. The Present Scene 
At th is t ime we can look around and find: " humanistic 
education"'- the " hands off " view of pedagogy and 
schooling-wobbling without a clear direction. Perhaps 
its followers have made their points and are now at a loss 
as to what to do next. This is plausible, for humanistic 
doctrine is philosophically thin , lacking the comprehen· 
siveness or penetration to support prolonged action. I 
shall return to this view in the third section of the present 
paper. 
The transmissionist or impositional view-hu· 
manism's historical adversary-seems to be healthy 
with educational technology, i.e., the technology of 
pedagogical imposi tion, continuing to attract great au· 
diences. The brutalness of imposition reflec ted in the 
Hoosier's School Master's reading, 'riting, and 'rithmetic 
taught to the tune of a hickory stick, seems to be in vogue 
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again in " back to bas ics." It seems to me that the trans· 
mission view with its ever-present technology Is pres· 
ently in position of the greatest momentum with regard 
to schooling and school policy-making. If we educatio n· 
lsts allow the present trend to fulfill itself we can expect 
to find imposition al lh<:lory dominating the 1980s. 
Optimists will say that humanistic education is less 
noticeable at present because many o f its princ iples have 
become internalized by the establishmen t. Yet anyone 
who is at all sensitive to !be notion of logical consistency 
must doubt this; how can humanistic principles be in· 
ternal ized by teachers who are taking more and more o f an 
educational technological view of things? 
If impositionism is to continue to dominate peda· 
gogical practice, then we must be prepared to accept its 
consequences. In modern social life, more than any 
other time in human history, Imposition is met with 
resistance. Conceptually, imposition and resistance are 
rec iprocal notions. When you are imposed upon, you 
resist; when school children and young adults are im· 
posed upon they resist. The transmission theory and i ts 
supported pract ice c learly identifies imposition. We are 
less famil iar with Its reci procal resis tance. But let us 
examine i t. 
Resistance can take two basic forms: active and 
passive. Active resis tance attempts to disrupt the im· 
position, weakening its impact. Passive resistance allows 
imposition to manifest itself but seeks to lessen its im· 
pact by giving It no target. In school, active resis ters are 
" d isc ipline problems," whi le passive resisters are "mo· 
t ivation problems." School authority knows how to deal 
with active resistance. But passive resistance is enigma. 
Passive resistance draws no punishment, just ignoral. 
Yet, passive resistance has its price-it's boring. • 
.... 
, 
-. 8.ecent attent ion has focused upon the use o f drugs 
by secondary, junior high and even elementary students. 
It is not possible that through the use of drugs the docil ity 
required by transmissional imposition becomes bearable? 
As far as I can determine, no drug usage studies exist 
which consider the type o f pedagogy as an independent 
variable. Yet, is it not plausible that drug usage is rendered 
effective given the impositional nature of the schooling 
environment? This is a significant area of empirical re· 
search which, as I see i t, deserves our attention in the 
1980's. If, as I am suggesting, drug usage is patterned ac· 
cord ing to pedagogical imposition, then this alone is evi· 
dence against impositionism in schooling. 
2. The Transmission View of Schooling 
There has always been wi th us, from Protagorus to 
Gagne, a transmission view of pedagogy and schooling. If 
one asks the average adult or undergraduate, " What are 
the purposes of the school or teaching?" one invariably 
receives a tradit ional transmissionist account of the ends 
of schooling. This tradition is quite strong and dominates, 
as near as I can tell, the thinking of the typical person. Yet, 
transmissionism has not remained static and \vas 
noticeably modified at the midpoint of this century. For 
this reason it is best to review transmissionism in two 
parts: traditional and modern. 
Traditional Transmissionism 
In the t ime of the ancients, there were established 
cultural facts and values into which chi ldren could be 
initiated. Since the content transmitted was stable and 
noncontroversial, the initiat ion process seemed straight 
forward . By the late nineteenth century, John Dewey 
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challenged this process. His classic Democracy and 
Education and his equally important Interest and Effort in 
Education, both published in the second decade of the 
twentieth century, constituted formidable opposition to 
straight tra nsmisslonlsm. 
The end of transmissionism, (i) a body of knowledge 
and skill, and (Ii) standards of conduct, whether pursued 
by the " Effort Theory" (or formal discipline) or the "In· 
terest Theory" (or sugar coating the bi tter pill) was at· 
tacked by Dewey in the classic argument that the object 
was assumed to be apart and alien to the developing child, 
and that all experience with children denied this assump· 
lion
. 
As an alternative view. a new view o f schooling was 
propounded-progressive education. 
While Dewey's arguments keep traditional trans· 
missionism on the ropes for the first third o f the twen· 
tleth century-it was never knocked out-the extreme 
child-centered wing of the Progressive Education Asso-
ciation undermined his attack. After all, If the project of 
study was part of the chi ld's nature, why not keep hands-
off and let th ings unfold according to nature's plan? 
Dewey's attack on the impositionism o f the transmission 
view ironically c leared the way for permlssivism. Dewey, 
of course, was attacking both imposlt lonism and the 
romantic hands·off approach when he claimed "psy-
chotogized " the child. Yet when one reads his words to-
day, the attack upon the impositionism of transmission 
thinking seems to receive the heaviest blows. 
Modern Transmisslonlsm 
At midcentury Ralph Tyler laid out his curriculum 
technology and i t received a strong positive response. 
There had been earlier transmisslonlsts who sought ef-
ficiency, but by Tyler's time there seemed to be less op-
position. Tylerian technology sought to improve out-
comes by improving means. 
A decade later The Process ot Education appeared, 
which of course originated " the structure of the 
disciplines movement" in curriculum development. If we 
could clarify the ends, the means would foll ow. Aim for 
the basic s truc ture, and chi ldren will be released 
somehow to become little scienti sts and mathematicians. 
Child psychologists were out and Ph.0.'s from the 
disciplines were in. It is as if the arts and sciences 
professors had finally won over professors of education, 
and they walked with arrogance through the captured 
public schools. · 
Yet things did not go as predicted. In 1971 Bruner, in 
" The Process of Education Revisited," took i t all back. 
I believe I would be quite satisfied to declare, i f 
not a moratorium, then something of a de· 
emphasis on matters that have to do with the 
structure of history, the structure of physics, 
the nature of mathematical consistency, and 
deal with it rather in the context of the 
problems that face us.' 
If Einstein could ask Newton's forgiveness for being 
right, Bruner should have asked for Dewey's for being 
wrong. 
While the structure of the disciplines movement has 
faded in science and mathematics, It Is somewhat alive In 
philosophy. From Kohlberg's moral development theory 
and Lipman's Philosophy for Children movement, one ex-
pects to find some teachers viewing value and/or moral 
education the way the structure of the disciplines 
teachers viewed their subjects. I am not claiming that 
Winier, 1980 
Kohlberg or Lipman and their theoretical associates are 
"Jonnie·come·lately's" to Brunerism. This is not the 
case. But I am concerned that some users of these ideas 
may fall into the same view as the earlier Bruneri tes; 
namely, some may come to view their task as trying to get 
the student to discover or build the basic structures o f 
moral reasoning like math and physics were supposed to 
be buil t. Whether we should have moral curricula, or what 
form they should take is not my point: I only want to warn 
against making the same mistakes contained in the struc-
ture of the disciplines approach-thinking that curriculum 
organization and materials are all that are required, whi le 
Ignoring educational psychology and teacher effective· 
ness research. · 
By the late 1960's, behaviorism and educational tech · 
nology (actually pedagogical technology) were growing 
strong. As the structure of the d isc iplines movement 
faded, the void in the foundations o f transmission-
Ism was filled with behaviorist technology. Transmission· 
ism was back to looking at its means again with the ends 
becoming of less concern. Philosophers will consider the 
behaviorist version of transmissioni sm Its most accept · 
able form, for it emphasizes individual differences in its 
principle that what Is reinforcing for one may not be so for 
another, and for its emphasis on positive reinforce· 
ment and ba.nishment of punishment. At present, behav· 
lorlsm seems alive and well . I shall return to i t later. 
3. The Romantic View of Schooling 
An alternative to the transmission view, romantic per· 
missivism, views childhood as complete in and of itself, 
requiring not active intervention bu l protection from in-
tervention; ' intervention' is equated with ' Imposition'. The 
earlier forms of romanticism and Its unfolding view of 
human development are familiar. Romanticism is often ac· 
cused of being based upon a biological growth metaphor, 
but this is inaccurate for there was no metaphor intended. 
Currently the romantic conception of pedagogy has taken 
two forms: " humanistic" education and developmen-
talism. 
Humanistic Education 
Humanistic education, as it is erroneously labeled, is 
said to derive from third force psychology . Maslow has led 
the way with Rogers contributing somewhat, and Combs 
Influencing curriculum theory. Maslow is a neo-Aris-
tolleian with self actualization as the Final Cause for per-
sons; philosophically this brand of determinism wil l 
simply not wash. If leads to all sorts of blunders such as 
confusions over the meaning of 'can' and 'ought', and the 
role and nature o f free choice. His " hierarchy o f needs" 
grounds his straight-line determin ism, making the 
evaluations of alternative directions unnecessary. In 
surely one o f his most absurd moments he equates the 
development of a chil d with that of a flower and kitten. I 
will not embarrass you with an analysis of this absurdity. 
K.P. Morgan once referred to Schwab as the Pied 
Piper of Curriculum theory,' but I have another candidate: 
Arthur w. Combs. As he recently put it, " The Humanistic 
Movement .• . is a revolution in human though!, a 
necessary occurrence in the sweep of human events."' 
We, of course, do not know the historical scope of this 
neoenlightment. But it seems to be third force enlight· 
ment. As he sees i t, we are faced with a choice between 
two systems of thinking: one open, one closed. We are at a 
fork In the road. We, In education, always seem to be at a 
fork or a crossroad; actually, I think we are, and have been 
25 
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for some time, on a rotary. 
The choice between two altern atives "co mmits us to 
quite different philosophical positions." The closed 
syslem depends upon a " management class," a "great 
man" . . . " who knows where the people should go," and a 
" diclal orship." "Open syslems are egalitorian ... essen-
tially democratic." In fact, as Combs puts it, 
From my point of view one of the comfo rt ing 
things about dealing with problems from an 
open system is i ts congruence with the 
democratic philosophy. My psychology is nol 
basically out of louch with my philosophy.• 
Of course Combs is committing the either/or fallacy, 
but what is interesting is 1hat he knows i t. He quotes 
Kelly: " Whenever you find Ideas expressed at opposite 
ends of a continuum in either/or fashion, it is almost cer-
tain they are both wrong." ' Ignoring Kelly 's confusion 
of degree and kind, we find Combs agreeing with Kelly 
(which is to agree with confusion) and nevertheless con-
tinuing to d iscuss his either/or reali ty. 
Without belaboring l he argument, I want to simp ly 
state that the so-cal led humanistic movement In edu-
cation is without inl elleclu al lea dership. 
Oevelopmentalis m 
The word 'development' under Piage t's In fl uence has 
taken on a special meaning. 'Development' suggests to 
most educationists 'development alism". The latl er is a 
hybrid form of innalism. Piage t Is a neo-Kantlan . Kant 
viewed the mind as innately structured In his doc trine o l 
synthetic a priori truths. Piaget objecls claiming that Kan t 
was talking about the most mature minds. Bui these struc-
tures are not in place at birth. Rather, they develop In three 
or four distinct stages. 
But why do they develop? Children encounter ex· 
perience and sooner or later become disequillbraled. 
Their cognitive structures do nol work well at explaining 
experience. This does not depend on Individual purposes. 
Disequilibrium is solely bio logical-a dysfunctional or-
ganism-environment relationship. 
How do these structures develop? Through assim-
ilation and accommodation equilibration is reestab-
lished. Assimilation is the process of coming at experi-
ence. It is what the person can do or make o f the en-
vironment. Accommodation Is what the environment 
makes of the person. Through accommodation one 
modifies one's structures, producing more adequate 
assimilations. Empiricists erred, according to Piaget, in 
believing that accommodation could go on without its 
complementary assimilations. Kant erred in the opposite 
direction by focusing on assimilation and omitting the 
point that accommodation was also going on. We might 
say that Kant discovered assimilation process through his 
trying to accommodate rationalist and empiricist thinging, 
while Piaget discovered accommodation by trying to 
assimilate both Kant's thinking and children's thinking. 
Ph ilosophically, Piaget Is a neo-Kantlan committed to 
synthetic a priori truths. Within contemporary phi losophy 
of science and philosophy o f mind this is untenable. He 
ignores the synthetic and analytic functions o f belie fs. I 
believe that th is omission is generated by his rejection of 
human purpose and his complete dependence on biology 
as the basis of knowing. The Issues here are histor ically 
wide and philosophically deep, and cannot be settled in 
this or any other short paper. All I want to establish is that 
Piagetian theory is based upon a rationalis tic conception 
of mind. Serious educati onal theorists should not commit 
to Piaget 's views or suggestions without careful phllo· 
sophic al nalysis of Piaget's basic assumptions.• The 
further analysis of Piaget has to be a high agenda Item for 
the 1980s. 
4. Traditional Progressivism 
Under Dewey the progressive alternative took its 
basic shape. As I read him he sought to give a systemalic, 
comprehensive, consistent accoun t o f the student, 
pedagogy, curriculum content, and the school and Its 
social context. In other words, he envisioned educatlooal 
theo ry as g iving an account of four factors, which may be 
thought of as follows: 
student 
con text 
To ignore any one of these four was to court dlsas.ter. 
But how can these factors be approached theo-
retically? Dewey's account of educati onal theory was based 
upon lhree fundamental theoretical fac tors: education, 




Education is, o f course, the highest value by which all 
else is to be evaluated. The cri terion of growth is the 
theoretical absolute by which all else is measured. This, 
by the way, is what the psychological humanism of the 
1970s was in its feeble way trying to get at but could not 
because of its ignoral of philosophy. Education was 
achieved, accord ing to Dewey, by inquiry on the personal 
level and democracy on the soc ial level. Only under the 
conditions of democracy is adequate inquiry possible; but 
this was not the argumen t. Only under democratic con· 
dit ions could the cri terion o f growth be fully achieved. 
Democracy frees both education and inquiry. Democracy 
provides the social conditions for education, wh ich frees 
inqui ry, which allows for the reconstruction o f experience 
. . . , i.e. , education. 
Through philosophical analysis. Dewey tried to 
elaborate the nature or these three theorell cal fac tors. 
Many of his writings are well -known, but, i t seems, poo rly 
understood. If I may be so brash to cri ticize In a few 
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lines his over thirty books and thousands of papers, I want 
to suggest that his weaknesses are to· be found in two 
areas; one of which I give him no responsibility-in fact he 
contributed very positively to it, and another which I al· 
tribute to him great responsibility. ThP. first of these Is 
educational psychology. Dewey was not practicing sci· 
ence yet he gave II many Important ideas. At Dewey's 
time educational psychology was just emerging under 
Thorndike who was, of course, a transmissionist. No edu· 
cational psychology was on the scene which was based 
upon progressive assumptions. Dewey was developing 
the progressive theory, but he could hardly be expected to 
develop i t in all areas. 
The second weakness in progressivism was of his 
making. In his desire to pu t together all that was separate 
he went, in my view, too far in his account o f inQuiry. As 
Chuck Brauner observes, before 1911 Dewey viewed 
inquiry as being of two pieces: one which served practical 
purposes and one which served scientific purposes. But 
by 1929, "Dewey welded those two approaches to ex· 
perimentation Into a new approach to the idea of a 
discipline of education."' Contemporary logic questions 
the sagacily of this approach. Some philosophers of 
science want to render asunder what Dewey sought to put 
together: theoretical and practical wisdom. As I shall 
argue, this approach has warrant. In current educational 
research there Is a good deal of interest in separating 
theoretical and "evaluation" studies. This distinction by 
the way has been much clearer than the old basic/applied 
distinction ever was. 
5. Sources of a Neo-Progressivism 
Stated negatively , the transmission and romantic 
views give us an Impetus to seek alternatives. More 
positively, the weakn esses in tradit ional progressive 
thinking are at present remedial. Contemporary psycho!· 
ogy and philosophy, in my view, o ffer possibi l ities lor re· 
constructlonlng progressivism. As Ryle once said of 
Hume, many have mistaken his footsteps for his destina· 
tion, one could also say this of Dewey. 
Psycho logical Sources 
Psychological thinking during the golden age of 
progressivism was bifurcated into behaviorism and what 
Dewey called " psychologizing" the child by various forms 
of animism. Behaviorism has continued to grow reaching 
full maturity under B.F. Skinner. G.H. Mead once com· 
mented that behaviorism was part of the "stimulus for a 
pragmatic philosophy."' There has always been an affinity 
between behaviorism and pragmatism; however, the two 
part company on the question of the role of human pur· 
pose and the related notion of consciousness in ex· 
plaining behavior. Pragmatism viewed behaviorism as too 
narrow and hence incomplete. 
Within the development o f psychology, there has de· 
veloped an alternative form of behaviorism which departs 
from the basic tradition from Watson to Skinner. Ban· 
dura's "Social Learning Theory" represents a refinement 
of Toulman's "purpo sive behaviorism" which was itself a 
psychological theory more in line with progressivism. I 
believe that Bandura's approach to psychology offers a 
scientific study of behavior which is based upon a 
metaphysics which is consistent with the earlier pro· 
gressive views of human nature. Furthermore, I believe 
that Bandura's views offer us a scienti f ic view of learning 
and experience which can provide for the development of 
a progressive theory of education. The earlier progres· 
Winter, 1980 
slvlsm·s educational psychology was adumbrated but 
never developed into an ongoing area of scientific inquiry. 
I am claiming that Bandura provides us with this actual· 
lzed inQuiry. Thus, a soft spot In lraditional progressivism 
Is presently remedial. Bandura's Social Learning Theory 
bolsters progressive thinking and fills a gap which Dewey 
had to accept-but wh ich we no longer have to. 
In his recent book, Social Learning Theory, Bandura 
briefly discusses the alternallve conceptions of social in· 
teraction. This attempt seems to clarify the nature of 
social interaction as it func llons as a basic metaphysical 
framework for his sclenllfl c endeavors. He claims that, 
" behavior, other personal factors, and environmental lac· 
lors all operate as interlocking de terminants of each 
other." 
A valid criti cism of extreme behaviorism is 
that, in a vigorous effort to avoid spurious inner 
causes, i t has neglected determinants of 
behavior arising from cognillve functioning ... 
Because some of the inner causes involved by 
theorists over the years have been Ill-founded 
does not justify excluding all ln1erna1 deter-
minants from scientific inquiry.• 
Bandura is attempting to broaden the behaviorist 
framework by opening the metaphysical locus standi to 
the existence of "internal" factors without explaining 
behavior in terms of antecedents as various innatist 
theories do. He is searching for an organism-environment 
relationship which is not one dimensional as are both en-
vironmentalist and antecedent accounts. Note how this 
view Is congruent with the hyphenated reality view held by 
Dewey. That is, Dewey rejected both the innatist or an· 
teceden1 s view, and the rad ical envi ronmental ist view of 
how behavior is explained. lnnatlsm locates the deter· 
mlnan ts o f behavior wi thin the organism, while en-
vironmentalism places these solely within the env i· 
ronment. Dewey argued that behavior Is best explained by 
appeal to, and the analyses of, the relationships which 
form between the organism and the environment of that 
organism. Consciousness is one of these relationships 
between an organism and a part of the environment or 
"situation," as Dewey called ii. Purpose is another. II 
seems to me that it is precisely this explanatory 
melhodology which Bandura and his associates are in-
vestigating. 
My purpose here is not to review and crit ique Social 
Learning Theory from a progressive point of view. All I 
want to do Is to ind icate how th is theory enhances 
traditional progressivism. My argument is stronger, how-
ever, lhan simply showing the theoretical compatability of 
Bandura and Dewey. Social Learning Theory is worthy of 
our attention for other reasons. 
Skinner, in his behavioris t analysis of ord inary Ian· 
guage (About Behaviorism, 1974), admits the existence o f 
reflective thinking but claims thal It is covert behavior 
which is modeled on overt behavior. "The words used to 
describe covert behavior are the words acquired when 
behaving publicaly." Skinner also claims that the ob-
servation of covert behavior is easy but does not tell us 
just how this is to be accomplished. For all of his careful 
analysis of many terms used In and around psychology, he 
says very little about covert behavior. Skinner's push for 
logical completeness seems to be having the effect of 
revealing an incompleteness in his theory, and possibly 
opening up radical behaviorism lo the arguments of 
trad itional progressivism. Behaviorism Is thus by no 
27 
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means an unassailable alternative to progressive theory. 
The other contemporary alternative to the progressive 
metaphysical framework is the antecedent view of human 
nature (alias: Jnnatlsm, romantic psychology, humanistic 
psychology, preformationlsm, and developmentalism). As 
I have ind icated, the "humanistic" theoretical foundations 
lack cogency, and the developmentalism of Piaget is 
based on a philosophy which has always had its em· 
barrassments. In other words, either direction which the 
antecedent view has taken leads into the teeth of 
trad itional philosophical objections. Stated differently, of 
the th ree traditional possibilities for philosophy of psy· 
chology, rationalism, empiricism, and pragmatism, prag· 
matic psychology is by no-means any weaker than its al· 
ternatives (objective empiricism or behaviorism and sub· 
jective empiricism or "humanism"), and I believe that So· 
c ial Learning Theory is, as a form of neoprogressivism, a 
good deal stronger. In other words, the psychological 
basis of neoprogresslvism is now emerg ing. 
Philosophical Sources 
As I have already indicated, I believe that the main 
weakness in Dewey's philosophy was his movement in 
logic away from his earlier distinction between practical 
and epistemic ends for inquiry. His holding to the ultimate 
value, growth, in no way undermines the warrant for 
separating two distinct kinds of thinking. Obviously we ex· 
peel that theoretical thinking will observe the criterion of 
growth (growth in theory); but it is also possible to view 
practical inquiry as also respecting the criterion of 
growth-thus, producing practical growth. It will be 
remembered that in Experience and Education Dewey 
argued that no other requi rements need be added to the 
notion of growth to justify or warrant a line of develop· 
ment; the criterion of growth was both necessary and suf· 
ficient. This argument-the argument from education or 
growth-separates Dewey from the maturationist or an· 
tecedent views of educational theory, neo-Aristotleians 
l ike Maslow and neo-Kantians like Piaget, and c learly 
establishes an alternative orientation or framework for 
educational theory. My point is that while the criterion of 
growth is both necessary and sufficient for judging the 
worthwhileness of any line of development, it does not 
make any line of development the only warranted one. 
Development can take many legitimate forms; that is, 
whether a child decides to become a physician, a teacher, 
a nuclear engineer, or an administrator, the criterion of 
growth is satisfied if and only if what one learns or what 
habits one forms allow for continued growth. This is not a 
philosophy of specialization. The professions, at present, 
are all reviewing themselves and finding that they have in· 
terpreted their roles too narrowly. Dental students are, for 
example, being told that they do not work solely on teeth, 
and that they must consider how the patient thinks and 
feels. The practice of dentistry requires the continued 
growth in the techniques of dentistry of course, but it also 
requires growth in the knowledge and understandings of 
one's patients' environmental situations. 
Within the context of educational inqu iry, the cri-
terion of growth can be adhered to without forcing all In· 
quiry into one methodology. Theoretical and practical In-
quiry are distinguishable, and this distinction does no vio· 
lence to the foundations of pragmatism. In fact Dew· 
ey's failure to retain this distinction led him to describe 
in his Sources of a Science of Education, 1929, a meth· 
28 
odology wh ich was quite Inhibiting to the growth of the 
science of pedagogy. 
In several papers I have tried to show that some of the 
arguments from philosophy of science aimed at the riddle 
of induction have great significance for how we view our 
work In education." The arguments given by Levi and 
Maxwell - wh ich I call the Levl·Maxwell thesis " -make it 
very clear that epistemic goals or ends require methods 
quite different from those required for the successful pur-
suit of practical goals. Since I have reviewed these 
arguments within the context o f pedagogical research 
elsewhere," I will here only briefly describe this approach. 
What Maxwell succeeded in doing was to show us 
how to deal with the problems-of selecting and modifying 
a metaphysical framework within which empirical science 
may be profitably conducted. Maxwell argues against 
Kuhn and Popper holding that it is possible to reconstruct 
our assumptions about rationality in light of our research 
experience with them. He specifies the rules for so doing 
in his "metamethodology." These rules grow out of his 
view of science as aim-oriented; or in Levi's words, "the 
aims of Inquiry control the legitimacy of inferences." 
Thus, for both Levi and Maxwell, science must constantly 
be re-evaluating its goals or ends in l ight of scientific ex-
perience with them. Maxwell goes beyond Levi, in 
showing us how metaphysical assumptions are necessary 
for, but controlled within, scientific Inquiry . 
It is clear from this literature that Levi and Maxwell 
are working with a means-ends analysi s of science, and 
are properly seen in the tradition of pragmatic philosophy. 
They have developed a neopragmatic analysis of scientific 
inquiry. Their arguments have a fairly direct bearing upon 
the direction and foundations of both empirical educa· 
tional research and philosophy of education. Since pro· 
gressivism in educational theory historically rested upon 
pragmatist conceptions of psychology and philosophy, 
and since there is warrant to claim that the Levi-Maxwell 
thesis offers a neopragmatic foundation of scientific in· 
quiry, I believe that there is reason to hold that the founda· 
lions for a neoprogressivism in educational theory are at 
this time in place rendering a neoprogressive view of edu· 
cation and schooling readi ly producible. The required neo· 
progressive philosophy is now in place. 
6. Conclusion 
I have tried to show the serious educationist that 
there are good reasons to give attention to a neopro· 
gressive theory of education. Ideas rooted in Dewey and 
enhanced by current research in psychology and 
philosophy provide the raw materials for us to begin to 
carve out a nli!w conception of school Ing for the 1980s 
which is worthy of a nation which has given leadership to 
the world in both science and democracy. The conditions 
are such that to view the earlier progressivism as nothing 
more than history, reflects an ignorance of both the past 
and the present. The future which this ignorance can write 
is not worthy of us. The intellectual elements are at hand 
to allow us-if we are really desirous and willing to make 
the great effort-to recast the schools, teaching, study· 
ing, and administration into forms where children and 
young adults will want to go to school, study, and in· 
quire; where teachers will want to meet their classes and 
tell their medical and legal counterparts that they are pub· 
lie school teachers; where principals and superinten-
dents will smile at their students and teachers, and not be 
asking whether more armed guards are required to walk 
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'Ibid. 
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their halls; where parents will see the schools they pay 
dearly for as centers for inquiry and not the narcotics 
market place. I put ii to you that these things can be; but 
we, the educational theorists, will have to let them be 
through our coming to grips with what the present offers 
us. 
'See Rott man's, Plagel: Paychologls1 of the Real, 1977, for an ex-
cellent review of Piaget's assumptions. 
' Charle s Brauner, American Educational Theory, 1964. 
• G.H. Mead, On Social Psychology, Chapter Four. 
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Origins of the 
Modern School System 
The democratization of education took place for two reasons: to provide the modern state with 
enlightened citizens and to train an eiflcient work force. In the nineteenth century, pol itical con · 
siderations predominated; educational reform went hand in hand with the broadening of the suf · 
frage, the disestablishment of religion, and lhe establishment of republican Institutions. Like these 
other innovations, the common school system grew out of the democratic revolution, which created 
a new type of citizenship based on equality before the law and limited government - a "government 
of laws, not men." The model citizen of early republican theory knew what his rights were and de· 
fended them from infringement by his fellow citizens and by the state. He could not be fooled by 
demagogues or overawed by the the learned obfuscations of professional wise men. Appeals to 
authori ty left him unimpressed. Always on the aleri for forgery, he had, moreover, enough wordly 
wisdom about men's motives, understand ing of the principles of critical reasoning, and skill in the 
use of language to detect intellec tual fraud in whatever form it presented itself. 
The Culture of Narcissism, American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations. Christopher 
Lasch. New York: W.W. Norton. 1978. p . 130. 
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